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abstract: This Task Force document discusses some relatively unexplored ethical issues involved in preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD). The document starts from the wide consensus that PGD is ethically acceptable if aimed at helping at-risk couples to avoid having a
child with a serious disorder. However, if understood as a limit to acceptable indications for PGD, this ‘medical model’ may turn out too restrictive.
The document discusses a range of possible requests for PGD that for different reasons fall outwith the accepted model and argues that instead of
rejecting those requests out of hand, they need to be independently assessed in the light of ethical criteria. Whereas, for instance, there is no good
reason for rejecting PGD in order to avoid health problems in a third generation (where the second generation would be healthy but faced with
burdensome reproductive choices if wanting to have children), using PGD to make sure that one’s child will have the same disorder or handicap as
its parents, is ethically unacceptable.
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Introduction
PGD has been the object of the Task Force’s deliberations before
(Shenfield et al., 2003). This new document is needed in view of the
dynamics of this technology and related discussions.
In the last two decades, in many countries PGD has become an estab-
lished reproductive option for people at high risk of having a child affected
with a genetic disorder or handicap. In comparison with the option of
prenatal diagnosis it is considered an advantage by many couples or
women thatwith PGD, theywill not have to consider the difficult decision
of terminating a wanted pregnancy. No doubt, PGD is still somewhat
controversial. Critics object, amongst others, that the embryo loss inher-
ent in PGD is morally unjustified, that the procedure is disproportionally
burdensome for women and that it is at odds with the rights and interests
of people with the disorders and handicaps selected against. These
objections, however, are not convincing; the moral status of the preim-
plantation embryo is relatively low, the balancing of the burdens and
advantages of the different options to avoid the conception or birth of
children affected with serious disorders is to a large extent a personal
matter and it is unwarranted to construe a fundamental conflict
between, on the one hand, the needs and rights of prospective parents
who want to prevent the conception or birth of a severely handicapped
child and, on the other hand, the interests and rights of disabled people.
The majority view seems to be that PGD is morally justified if it fits the
medicalmodel (PGDasameans toavoid the transmission ofdisease), more
particularly: when it aims to eliminate a high risk of having a seriously
affected child. This view, however, is being challenged: both the variables
used to define the medical model, and the (interpretation of the) medical
model itself, are contested. This document discusses the following issues:
– PGD for lower-penetrance mutations and for disorders that have
a highly variable expression;
– PGD for so-called indirectly medical reasons, particularly in order
to avoid the conception of healthy carriers who are at high risk of
having affected children themselves;
– PGD for risk reduction (in case the risk of transmitting a particular
disorder cannot be completely eliminated);
– PGD aiming at selecting an affected embryo, in order to guarantee
the birth of a child affected with the same disorder as the pro-
spective parent(s);
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– transferring (possibly) affected embryos after failed PGD or when
no ‘healthy’ embryos (i.e. embryos unaffected with the disorder
tested for) are available for transfer.
The use of micro-arrays in PGD is a new development that requires sep-
arate discussion and is therefore not addressed in this document. The
routine testing of embryos for aneuploidy (PGS) in order to enhance
the chances of a successful IVF treatment has a different aim than PGD
as discussed in this document and is therefore also beyond its scope.
Background and Facts
PGD mostly refers to the cascade of (i) IVF/ICSI, followed by (ii) a biopsy
of material to be tested (one or both polar bodies, a blastomere or some
trophectoderm cells), and (iii) PGD in the strict sense, aiming at (iv) a se-
lective transfer of an unaffected embryo. PGD has been applied for some
25 years; thousands of ‘PGD-babies’ havebeen born so far. The reliability
of the genetic tests used is very high in most cases. Although there are still
some safety concerns (especially related to the biopsy of blastomeres),
data so far suggest that the procedure might decrease the pregnancy
rate, but does not adversely affect the condition of children thus con-
ceived (Harper, 2009; Liebaers et al., 2011).
So far, PGD has been applied mainly to disorders caused by complete
or very high penetrance mutations. Good examples include Huntington
disease (HD), a late-onset, neurogenetic disorder and cystic fibrosis
(CF). Clinical experience shows, however, that some couples, because
of their family history, may worry about incomplete or lower-penetrance
mutations involved in serious disorders. A first cluster of examples
regards oncogenetic disorders. A well-known case is hereditary breast
and ovarian cancer (HBOC). Female carriers of relevant BRCA muta-
tions have a life-time risk of up to 80% for breast cancer and up to 60%
for ovarian cancer. Preventive measures for carriers, which provide sub-
stantial but incomplete protection, include periodic examinations, medi-
cation and prophylactic surgery (bilateral mastectomy and ovariectomy).
A second example regards a less well-known risk factor for HD: the
so-called reduced penetrance allele (RPA). HD is caused by an unstable
CAG trinucleotide repeat expansion in exon 1 of the IT15 gene. Normal
alleles contain a maximum of 26 CAG repeats. Alleles with 40 or more
CAG repeats are full penetrance alleles (FPA). So far, the discussion on
PGD for HD focused on this type of carrier. But this is only part of the
picture. Individuals with 36–39 CAG repeats carry a RPA. For RPA car-
riers, a maximum risk of 60% of being symptomatic at the age of 65 years
and a 70% risk at the age of 75 years were reported (Quarrellet al., 2007).
RPAsareunstable upon transmission, mainly through the male germ-line.
It has been reported that 14% of alleles transmitted from the reduced
penetrance rangeexpanded into the fully penetrant range in a large Vene-
zuelan kindred (Brocklebank et al., 2009). Carriers of a RPA regularly ask
for PGD (De Die et al., 2013).
A third example of incomplete penetrance regards cardiogenetic dis-
eases, such as cardiomyopathies and long QT syndrome (LQTS), which
may result in early sudden (cardiac) death (Kuliev et al., 2012). A large
number of different mutations are involved in these disorders. In some
families, the disorder may be caused by more than one mutation,
meaning that the disorder is polygenic. The penetrance of these
mutations is often in the range of 30–70%, and likely to be influenced
by modifying genes, making it regularly difficult to predict individual
risk. Preventive measures for carriers, which provide substantial, but
incomplete protection, include medication, adaptation of lifestyle and in-
ternal cardiac defibrillators.
Although experience so far is limited, there is a growing interest in
PGD for mitochondrial (mt) DNA disorders caused by a mutation in
the mtDNA, such as mitochondrial encephalopathy, lactic acidosis and
stroke-like episodes (MELAS) and Leigh. The genetics of these maternal-
ly inherited disorders is complex. For the purpose of this document, one
aspect is particularly relevant. Ideally, one would like to transfer embryos
without a (detectable) mutant load. But if such embryos are not available
after PGD, one has to consider whether or not to transfer the embryo
with the lowest mutant load, thus creating the highest probability of a
healthy child (Sallevelt et al., 2013).
Some applicants ask for PGD to avoid a high repro-genetic risk for
healthy future children. The best example regards male patients suffering
from an X-linked recessive disease, like haemophilia, who prefer to have
sons only, as sons will not carry the mutation (they inherit the Y chromo-
some from their father), while all daughters (who inherit their father’s
affected X chromosome) will be obligate carriers. These daughters’
genetic risk of having an affected child is 25% (50% of their sons will be
affected). Conceiving sons only would avoid reproductive dilemmas
for the applicants’ future children. A somewhat similar case may
regard prospective parents at risk of having a child affected with a dis-
order caused by a mutation in the woman’s mtDNA; taking account of
the possible residual risk after PGD for mtDNA disorders (see above),
the possibly increasing mutant load after transmission to grandchildren,
and the maternal inheritance of these disorders, one might consider
to engage in additional sex selection in order to conceive a boy
(Bredenoord et al., 2010).
Three percent of American IVF-PGD clinics report having provided
PGD to couples who seek to use PGD to select an embryo for the pres-
ence of a disability (Baruch et al., 2008). The best-known example con-
cerns hereditary deafness. In cases of non-syndromic, monogenetic
deafness, various situations may be discerned in view of its genetic
heterogeneity: some deaf couples can conceive deaf children only,
others can have hearing children only, while a third group can have
both (the reproductive genetic risk is 50–75% in the latter group). Of
course, PGD is only possible if the causative mutation is known. Some
deaf couples apply for PGD in order to select for deafness, i.e. to
make sure that the baby will be deaf like themselves. A second case is
autosomal dominant achondroplasia, the most common skeletal dyspla-
sia, resulting in shortened limbs, a large head and an average trunk;
so-called ‘little people’ sometimes want to guarantee the conception
of a little child by means of PGD.
General Ethical Principles
Respect for reproductive autonomy
Reproductive autonomy not only regards people’s freedom (or liberty
right) to decide whether or not to have children, but also, at least to
some extent, to decide about the health of their possible future children.
At the heart of the latter is prospective parent’s freedom to avoid the
conception or birth of affected children. There is a strong consensus
that PGD is a morally sound method to do so and that people’s
preferences for this method should be respected, at least in principle.
There is an ongoing discussion, however, about conditions to be
imposed on PGD.
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Informed consent is, obviously, a prerequisite for PGD. Consent should
be voluntary and based on adequate information, taking account of the
pros and cons of the different reproductive options.
Non-maleficence and beneficence
Even though IVF/ICSI carries (some) risks and burdens for women, the
provision of (IVF/ICSI-)PGD to prospective parents at high risk of having
an affected child meets the principle of beneficence, as this may restore
people’s reproductive confidence and contribute to familial flourishing,
while avoiding the disadvantages inherent in other strategies of ‘avoid-
ance’, like the trauma of having a (repeated) selective termination of a
wanted pregnancy.
Professionals involved in medically assisted reproduction should avoid
a high risk of serious harm to the future child (ESHRE, 2007). Further-
more, even if a particular risk is not a priori unacceptable or prohibitive,
professionals should try to further reduce reproductive risks to the
extent that doing so is reasonably possible and proportional. Harmful
consequences for the child may be psychosocial (related to, e.g., a lack
of parental competence), medical/genetic or mixed. Although follow-up
studies so far are reassuring, the possible (subtle) risks of the biopsy for
the health of children conceived by means of PGD are still a matter of
concern. For this reason, these studies should be continued (ESHRE,
2007).
With regard to PGD in the strict sense, it is generally assumed thatpro-
fessional responsibility entails the obligation to not (deliberately) transfer
an affected embryo.
Justice
Every person, regardless of income or financial means, should have
access to a decent minimum of health care. For people with a high risk
of having a child with a disease or disability, and not willing to consider
pregnancy termination after prenatal testing, it may be difficult to
justify reproduction unless they are able to eliminate or decrease the
risk. PGD gives people in these circumstances an equal opportunity to
have an unaffected (genetically related) child. IVF/ICSI-PGD should be
funded at least partly in relatively affluent societies (Pennings et al., 2008).
Although PGD may generate cost savings, the practice should not be
regarded as an alternative to adequate treatment or care for future
people with (congenital) disabilities and their families. The concern has
been raised that prospective parents taking repro-genetic risks may in
some countries no longer expect that society is willing to pay for the
care and treatment of possible affected children. Obviously, such a
policy would not only undermine reproductive autonomy, it would
also be unjust in that de facto children would be punished for their
parents’ presumed negligence.
Specific Considerations
Specific ethical issues include, firstly, questions related to defining indica-
tions for PGD, and secondly, problems arising with professionals’ re-
sponsibility to take account of the welfare of the child. Obviously,
there is significant overlap between these categories of issues.
Indications: a matter of proportionality
The moral acceptability of PGD depends on the proportionality of the
procedure, which requires that the efforts, burdens and possible risks
of IVF/ICSI for women involved, the possible risks of IVF/ICSI and the
(so far: theoretical) health risks of PGD for future children thus con-
ceived, the inherent embryo loss, and the costs of the procedure, espe-
cially if collectively funded, must be in proportion to the benefit of
avoiding the conception of an affected child. Psychological and contextual
aspects should also be taken into account in this balancing (Pennings and
De Wert, 2012).
Problems of a restrictive view
There is wide support for the view that PGD is certainly proportional in
case of a high risk of serious disease. However, the view that PGD would
only be justified for disorders that meet the criteria of full penetrance, in-
variability, severe expression and lack of treatment options, is far too re-
strictive. It would, firstly, be at odds with widely established PGD
practice. There has been a strong consensus since its introduction that
PGD, for example for medical sex selection, is justified even though
the risk for future boys is ‘just’ 50% (Dondorp et al., 2013). And although
PGD for BRCA-mutations predisposing to HBOC was the topic of sub-
stantial commotion in many countries, it is now widely considered to be
morally justified in view of the fact that the penetrance of these muta-
tions, even if incomplete, is still high. Furthermore, even if prevention
by means of, for example, prophylactic bilateral mastectomy and ovari-
ectomy is possible, this is very burdensome for women. For these
reasons, the fear of transmitting the mutation to one’s future children
is understandable. The restrictiveview would, secondly, express a debat-
able ‘PGD-exceptionalism’: why impose such a restrictive framework on
PGD while prenatal testing, for example for Down syndrome (the most
common indication for prenatal testing), is widely considered to be
morally justified, even though Down syndrome has a highly variable
expression and the dominant ethical view is that a fetus has a higher
moral status than a preimplantation embryo?
A list of sufficiently serious disorders?
It is sometimes recommended to top-down make a restrictive list of
serious disorders that qualify for PGD, in order to avoid its possible
misuse. As is known from former debates about prenatal diagnosis,
however, it is notoriously difficult to drawa line between serious and non-
serious disorders (Wertz and Knoppers, 2002). Arguments against a re-
strictive list include that many, if not most, genetic disorders have a vari-
able expression, that such a list could stigmatize people with disorders
and handicaps, and would insufficiently take account of peoples’ subject-
ive perception of seriousness. Traumatic experiences with a particular
disability in one’s family, for instance, may substantially influence
people’s perception—what is less serious for many people may be
much more serious for others. Counselling or psychotherapy, aiming at
acceptance of the particular repro-genetic risk, may, then, be the first
option, but when ineffective, PGD may be a reasonable strategy. The re-
lational aspects of disorders should also be considered. Particular genetic
skin diseases, forexample,maybe mildwith regard to thephysical impact,
but have adverse, even invalidating, social, relational and sexual implica-
tions. Last but not least: even proponents of a restrictive list strongly dis-
agree about relevant variables (lethality, life expectancy, treatability, age
of onset, etc.) and about the specification of those variables.
Points to consider in individual requests
Points to consider in dealing with individual requests for PGD include the
seriousness of the disease in the particular families, the existence of
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possible treatments, the effectiveness and burdens of these treatments,
the penetrance of mutations involved (related to the predictive values of
a positive test result), and personal experiences and circumstances of the
individual applicants.
PGD for mutations with a lower penetrance
Some newer applications of PGD do raise questions in view of, for in-
stance, a lower penetrance of the relevant mutations. PGD for carriers
of an RPA for HD, for example, may be more controversial. After all, if
children inherit a RPA, approximately one-third of them will never
develop HD, and if they do, it will probably be later in life. Furthermore,
the risk that the parent’s RPAexpands to an FPA in a future child seems to
be just 15%. Still, PGD for carriers of a RPA may be morally justified (De
Die et al., 2013). For some of these applicants, the (lower but still) sub-
stantial risk of having a child affected with HD, albeit late(r) in life, is simply
unacceptable and may completely undermine their reproductive confi-
dence. In addition, prospective parents may want to avoid the trans-
generational reprogenetic risk, i.e. the burdening of their future child
with the same reproductive dilemmas that they themselves are facing.
Furthermore, one should take account of the emotional and moral
costs and disadvantages of alternative reproductive options, such as
gamete donation and prenatal testing and, possibly, a selective termin-
ation of pregnancy.
Concerns about possible adverse psychological consequences for
future children of HD-related psychiatric problems of prospective
parents carrying a FPA will probably be less relevant regarding applicants
for PGD who carry a RPA, in view of the lower penetrance and the later
age of onset.
Like oncogenetic disorders and RPAs for HD, cardiogenetic disorders
may entail substantial genetic risks for progeny which prospective
parents may reasonably want to avoid, especially when confronted
with (multiple) sudden cardiac death(s) in younger relatives. Here
again, PGD may be justified in view of the suboptimal effectiveness and
adverse quality of life implications of preventive and therapeutic options.
The question whether PGD for mutations with a lower penetrance
may be acceptable can only be answered in the context of balancing all
relevant variables mentioned, including age of onset, treatability, and ef-
fectiveness and burdens of possible treatments. Obviously, trying to con-
ceive children completely free from genetic susceptibilities is a misguided
effort, as we are all ‘fellow mutants’. This should be clearly communi-
cated during genetic counselling. Applicants for PGD for multifactorial
congenital malformations should also understand that regular prenatal
diagnosis (especially prenatal ultrasound) may be far more informative
than PGD; while a genetic susceptibility for such a malformation is just
a risk factor, with a mostly lower, or evenuncertain, predictive value, pre-
natal ultrasound may show whether this risk has been materialized (De
Wert and Geraedts, 2006).
Proportionality affecting considerations
When evaluating the proportionality of PGD, two further considerations
are important. Firstly, in a significant number of cases requests for PGD
regard not just one, but a combination of two disorders, one of them
being (relatively) mild. While performing IVF/ICSI-PGD just for a rela-
tively mild disorder (vitiligo and phenylketonuria (PKU) may be good
cases) or for a lower (e.g. 20%) penetrance mutation may be dispropor-
tionate, it may well be proportionate and morally justified to additionally
test embryos for such a mild disorder or lower-risk factor in the context
of PGD for a serious disorder which, as such, easily qualifies for PGD.
Secondly, a distinction must be made between fertile people who
apply for IVF/ICSI-PGD just in order to avoid the birth of an affected
child and couples who opt for IVF/ICSI because of sub-/infertility, and
who want to add PGD in order to avoid the transmission of a particular
genetic disorder. The proportionality principle entails that for sub-/infer-
tile couples the criteria for acceptable PGD-indications can be more per-
missive, as the decision to engage in IVF/ICSI (and accept its risks,
burdens, costs and inherent embryo loss) has already been made for
reasons of infertility treatment - the couple will have IVF/ICSI anyway.
As there will mostly be more than one suitable embryo, and ‘not select-
ing’ (i.e. transferring all available embryos) is not an option, the decision
to engage in PGD may be relatively simple to justify. Take the case of ICSI
for males with an Yq microdeletion (Stouffs et al., 2005). Most sons will
be infertile. Even though most couples do not make use of this option,
PGD to select female embryos in order to avoid the transmission of in-
fertility is morally justified.
Sex selection for indirectly medical reasons
What if a male affected with an X-linked disorder, such as haemophilia,
were to request PGD to select for male embryos, in order to avoid
repro-genetic dilemmas for his future child: would this be an acceptable
indication for PGD/sex selection?
Adhering to the medical model as traditionally understood, the
answer should be negative; as none of the patient’s children will be
affected with haemophilia, there is no medical indication for PGD/sex
selection. This reasoning, however, may not do justice to the problem
at hand (De Wert, 2005). The patient’s reason for sex selection could
be classified as ‘mixed’; the dichotomy between medical and non-
medical applications is not as clear-cut as is usually suggested. On the
one hand, the reason is non-medical, as (apart from exceptional cases)
future daughters would not be affected. On the other hand, the
reason is a medical one: some couples find it of utmost importance to
stop the transmission of the causative mutation just in order to spare
their children the agony of burdensome reproductive choices. A more
permissive interpretation of the medical model’s guiding principle, allow-
ing PGD not only for the diagnosis of defects which affect the prospective
child itself, but also for the diagnosis of genetic characteristics which may
adversely affect the trans-generational health of the grandchildren, may
well be legitimate.
This application is sometimes criticized as ‘eugenic’ (Ruppel and
Mieth, 1998). This term is, however, not very helpful for ethical discus-
sions, as it may have very different meanings and implications (Paul,
1994). If eugenics is understood as an attempt to avoid a presumed ‘de-
terioration of the gene pool’, this is not what motivates these applicants.
Critics may also object that, looking at the balance of burdens and
benefits, PGD for trans-generational health is disproportional. This,
however, seems too general a statement. The objection is valid with
regard to—rather theoretical—applications of PGD just to prevent
the conception of children carrying autosomal recessive mutations.
However, the risk of future children being confronted with serious repro-
ductive dilemmas is very high in the case of X-linked recessive disorders.
That said, it is important to balance the respective pros and cons of sex
selection by means of PGD on the one hand and preconception sex se-
lection on the other. Flow cytometric sorting of sperm (FCSS) seems to
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be a promising strategy, especially if the costs would decrease (Karabi-
nus, 2009). FCSS could, even if not fully effective, either be a good alter-
native for more burdensome IVF/ICSI-PGD, or be used as a preselection
step, providing a much better starting position for sex selection in the
context of IVF/ICSI-PGD. Given remaining questions regarding its
safety, centres offering FCSS should commit themselves to careful mon-
itoring and follow-up in order to provide data for assessing its longer term
safety (Dondorp et al., 2013).
From risk elimination to risk reduction
PGD for mtDNA disorders may show that none of the embryos tested is
without a mutant load; one may then consider to transfer the embryo
with the lowest mutant load (the lowest residual risk). Possible objec-
tions to PGD ‘only for risk reduction’ include that this is at odds with
the proper aim of PGD, that it is too complex for applicants who lack
understanding of mitochondrial genetics and that it does threaten the
welfare of the future child thus conceived (Bredenoord et al., 2008).
Obviously, the traditional aim of PGD is to eliminate a particular
genetic risk. But it does not follow that PGD in order to substantially
reduce risk is necessarily inappropriate. A crucial point to consider for
the clinical application of PGD for mtDNA disorders, especially when
this regards so-called heteroplasmic mutations, concerns the welfare
of the future child. In view of the professional responsibility to avoid a
high risk of serious harm, a cut-off point (a threshold of mutant load)
should be determined (for each relevant mutation) below which
embryos are eligible for transfer. If, unfortunately, only embryos above
the threshold are found, a transfer of any of these would be unsound.
Instead, one may either opt for a new IVF/ICSI-PGD cycle or stop
trying PGD. As a new cycle may lead to embryos with a lower or even
zero mutant load, this may be in line with the responsibility of parents
and professionals to further reduce the risk for the future child. On the
other hand, a new cycle must be proportional, also in view of the only
limited chance that better embryos will indeed be found. Adding IVF/
ICSI-PGD cycles should, therefore, not be presented as morally required
if an embryo with a mutant load below the cut-off point is available and
the prospective parents want to proceed to transfer. The number of pos-
sible additional cycles should be determined on a case-by-case basis, de-
pending on the clinical implications of the specific mutation, the
preferences of the couples (especially the women) involved, their
chances of success, and the number of cycles allowed and reimbursed
in a country.
Taking account of the scientific complexities and uncertainties
involved, especially in the case of PGD for unstable mtDNA mutations
with an unpredictable outcome, this application of PGD should be em-
bedded in a scientific research protocol, in order to gather more data
regarding the implications of different mutant loads for developing
good clinical practice. As follow-up studies involving children thus con-
ceived are both scientifically needed and ethically controversial (in
view of the child’s right not to know), this issue should be addressed in
further ethical debate (Bredenoord et al., 2009).
A residual mutant load in a transferred female embryo may, after
future maternal transmission, rise (again) above the level of disease ex-
pression in the next generation (in grandchildren). Additional sex selec-
tion, aiming at the selective transfer of male embryos in the context of
PGD for a mtDNA disorder, can be a way to reduce this residual, trans-
generational risk. This strategy may be ethically justified if, after PGD for
mtDNA disorders, sufficient healthy and good quality embryos of the
male sex are available for transfer (Bredenoord et al., 2010). Again, pre-
conception sex selection can be a useful preselection step.
Clearly, PGD for mtDNA disorders entails complex information, dif-
ficult decisions and possible decisional conflicts between applicants and
providers. These aspects should be given due attention in pre-test coun-
selling, in order to help applicants anticipate, understand and weigh pos-
sible problems and limitations of the procedure. Discussing the pros and
cons of the various alternative reproductive options, including oocyte
donation, is especially important in order to facilitate informed repro-
ductive decisions.
PGD in order to conceive an affected child
This type of PGD is highly controversial. The ethical debate concentrates
on the case of a deaf couple’s request for PGD in order to select for (non-
syndromic) deafness. Proponents point to various psychosocial and de-
velopmental risks of hearing children who grow up with (two) deaf
parents. Concerns include that hearing children will have difficulties in
understanding the implications of their parents’ disability, that deaf
parents will have only limited access to the experiences of hearing chil-
dren and that there is a risk of role inversion. Furthermore, proponents
argue that deafness is not a handicap or disability, but just a variant on the
spectrum of normalcy. After all, deaf people have their own rich culture
and their own, non-verbal, language: Sign. Advocates of the so-called
social model of disability add that it is society which disables physically
impaired persons by excluding them from equal participation in all
sorts of worthwhile societal activities.
This view is, however, problematic for a combination of two reasons.
First, the premise that deafness is ‘just a variant’ is untenable (De Wert,
2009; Davis, 2010). Of course, deaf people can, and usually do, live a rea-
sonable happy life. But still, deafness is a real disability. A serious weakness
of the socialmodel ofdisability is that it disregardsproblems and limitations
that cannot be circumvented or eliminated by even the most ideal, barrier-
free, society (Shakespeare, 2006). Outside the micro-cosmos of the deaf
subculture deafness is a disability which causes a variety of serious chal-
lenges—think of increased risks in traffic—and substantially limits the
deaf person’s opportunities in terms of relations and occupations.
Second: PGD aiming at selection for deafness—while there are ‘hearing
embryos’ available for transfer—is at odds with the responsibility both
of the parents-to-be and of professionals providing assisted reproduction,
to do whatever is reasonably possible and proportional to ensure that the
child they are about to create will have a life with more rather than less
health and well-being. This view does not imply that deaf people have a
life not worth living, nor that prospective parents are morally obligated
to prevent the conception or birth of a deaf child, let alone that coercive
preventive measures would be justified. The argument is that if one
engages in PGD, and is able to choose between hearing and deaf
embryos, one should in principle prioritize hearing embryos for transfer.
Selection for deafness can, therefore, not be accepted as an indication
for PGD. Applicants’ developmental and psychosocial concerns should
be tackled by counselling and educational support, not by ‘dysgenic’ PGD.
New medical technologies may lend further support for this position.
When improved versions of the cochlear implant (or revolutionary cell
or gene therapy) will become available in the future, parents will harm
a child they leave deaf. To select for a deaf child, then, becomes self-
defeating (Glover, 2006).
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A similar case regards PGD to select for achondroplasia. For some
commentators, this case may be ethically less problematic than selecting
embryos for deafness, as ‘dwarfism’ (a term that should be avoided as
much as possible) often seems more of an inconvenience than a disability
(Solomon, 2012). No doubt, little people, like deaf and most other
people, can and do have a rich life, but one should acknowledge that chil-
dren with achondroplasia are at increased risk for various complications
and conditions (including life-threatening brain-stem compression and
recurrent, damaging, ear infections), while adult little people often
suffer spine deformities and chronic back pain, and are far more likely
than their average counterparts to need surgical interventions through-
out life. Taking account of parental and professional responsibility to
preferably transfer available embryos free from achondroplasia, the
opinion that not to offer PGD to select for achondroplasia amounts
to ‘coercive eugenics’ (a view taken by the Little People of America
Advocacy Committee), is difficult to accept.
Transferring a (possibly) affected embryo
if no other embryos are available?
Sometimes PGD fails, so the result is inconclusive and the precise genetic
status of the embryo is unknown. In other situations, all embryos tested
prove to be affected. In rare cases, especially when this is the last chance
of (infertile) couples to have a genetically related child, they may ask to
transfer one of these embryos. Can a transfer be justified in such cases
when the couple requests this?
In traditional genetic counselling, especially in the context or prenatal
diagnosis, it is generally accepted that professionals should not try to
impose their own views upon pregnant women. Non-directive counsel-
ling, aimed at supporting people’s autonomous reproductive choice,
‘whatever they decide’, is the professional standard. This normative
framework cannot, however, be simply extrapolated to the context of
medically assisted reproduction in general and PGD in particular,
because professionals involved have a co-responsibility for the welfare
of future children conceived with their assistance. Against this back-
ground, most PGD centres accept the policy to never transfer an affected
embryo and likewise abstain from transferring an embryo after failed
PGD—even if there are no other, ‘healthy’, embryos available. This
policy meets the primary aim of PGD and seems to best fit the principle
to avoid a high risk of serious harm to future children.
But even though the latter principle is justified, there seem to be good
reasons to acknowledge an increasing number of exceptions to the trad-
itional policy.
A first variable relates to the severity of the disorder. In many cases,
the severity of the disorder is evident, so a transfer would be fully un-
acceptable - not only when the embryo is proven to be affected, but
probably also after a PGD failure, as the a priori risk that the embryo is
affected will be (very) high, mostly in the range of 25–50%. Obviously,
if the couple is fertile, they may then decide to engage in natural repro-
duction in order to have a child. This may be ethically problematic. At
the same time, however, this freedom is not a good reason for profes-
sionals to disregard their own professional responsibility to abstain
from assistance in reproduction in case of a high risk of serious harm.
But clearly, situations may be very different. In some cases, a transfer of
a possibly severely affected embryo cannot, paradoxically, result in the
birth of a child affected with the particular disorder because of natural se-
lection in utero. Think, for example, of incontinentia pigmenti (Edwards,
2002). Affected females have mild to serious handicaps, whereas male
embryos carrying the mutation will spontaneously abort (and male non-
carriers will be healthy). Obviously, a decision to transfer a male embryo
after failed mutation analysis could not result in the birth of a seriously
affected boy—and would not violate professionals’ responsibility to
avoid a high risk of serious harm.
In addition, a flexible use of the proportionality criterion regarding the
indications for PGD may allow for some more exceptions to the rule to
never transfer an affected embryo or an embryo at high risk. If one
accepts, for example, that in the context of treating infertile applicants
who will engage in IVF/ICSI anyway, less serious disorders, such as
male infertility caused by a microdeletion on the Y chromosome, may
qualify for PGD, transferring an embryo carrying such a deletion may
well be acceptable if there are no other embryos available. Likewise, if
one would engage in combination PGD and add selection against a less
serious disorder, like vitiligo or PKU, to PGD for a serious disorder,
the transfer of an embryo only affected with the milder condition may
well be justified—as long is this would not violate the principle to avoid
high risk of serious harm to the future child.
Apart from this, one will regularly be confronted with so-called
‘unexpected’ or ‘incidental’ findings. Think of PGD for a particular trans-
location, showing that the one single embryo available for transfer ‘unex-
pectedly’ has an XXY-karyotype (linked with Klinefelter syndrome). This
is generally considered to be a mild sex chromosomal disorder, so a
transfer would not be at odds with the responsibility to avoid a high
risk of serious harm (De Wert, 2009). The increasing use of genome
wide-testing in preimplantation embryos will confront couples and pro-
fessionals involved far more often with such unexpected findings and
decisions (Hens et al., 2013).
Even though transferring an affected embryo or an embryo at high risk
could be morally justified in particular cases, it is important to consider a
second variable: would it be possible and proportional to try to avoid the
disorder or risk by offering another IVF/ICSI-PGD cycle? Again, this can
only be decided case-by-case.
Thirdly, parental motives are important. The applicants’ primary wish
may be for a child. If, unfortunately, they cannot have a healthy child, they
may also be happy with and be good parents for a child with (a high risk of
developing) the disease they at first intended to avoid. A transfer, then, is
not necessarily ethically problematic—as long as the responsibility to
avoid serious suffering for future children is not violated. Relevant exam-
ples may include PKU and (hereditary) deafness (selecting for deafness is
not the point of the procedure here). In order to avoid instant decisions
and to stimulate well-considered choice, cryopreservation of the
embryos, enabling postponement of the (possible) transfer, is important
especially when the test result was not expected by the prospective
parents and when they lack relevant knowledge of and experience
with the particular condition.
Finally, after failed PGD, applicants may ask for a transfer of an embryo
at high risk with the intention to have prenatal testing and terminate preg-
nancy in case of a positive test result (Pennings et al., 2003). This will con-
front the professional with a dilemma: should he respect this wish,
assuming that the applicants will indeed try to avoid a high risk of
serious harm and have prenatal testing (and termination of pregnancy)?
Or should he abstain from the transfer, because people may change
their minds or even betray the professional? Although there may be no
single solution for this dilemma, a transfer may be justified after extensive
counselling.
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Taking into account all these possible conflicts regarding embryo
transfer after PGD, it is imperative to pay due attention to such conflicts
and the centre’s policy before starting an IVF/ICSI-PGD (or PGD) cycle,
in order to both contribute to well-informed decisions of applicants and
to prevent conflicts regarding transfer as much as is reasonably possible.
Conclusions and
Recommendations
– PGD is morally acceptable if it meets the proportionality criterion.
Psychological and relational factors should be taken into account
when discussing possible indications for PGD. The threshold for
PGD should be somewhat lower or more permissive for sub-/in-
fertile people who opt for IVF/ICSI anyway and for additional
testing in the context of combination PGD.
– It is imperative to adequately inform and counsel applicants
before starting an (IVF/ICSI-) PGD cycle about its complexities
and uncertainties, including possible dilemmas and conflicts
regarding embryo transfer after PGD, and about alternative re-
productive options in order to both contribute to well-informed
decision-making and to prevent conflicts as much as is reasonably
possible.
– PGD/sex selection for indirectly medical reasons, aiming at the
avoidance of transgenerational transmission, may be morally jus-
tified. Preconception sex selection may be a useful preparatory
step.
– PGD for mtDNA disorders may be a reproductive alternative for
carriers of mtDNA mutations. Taking account of its complexities
and uncertainties, however, such PGD needs to be embedded in
scientific research. Follow-up studies among children thus con-
ceived need further ethical scrutiny.
– PGD in order to select for handicap/disability is morally un-
acceptable.
– The policy to never transfer either an affected embryo or a ‘high
risk’ embryo after failed PGD needs reconsideration. Doctors
should stick to the high risk of serious harm standard, but be sen-
sitive to the specifics of individual cases. If one considers a transfer
of an affected or a ‘high risk’ embryo, cryopreservation of the
embryo and postponement of the final transfer decision is import-
ant in order to facilitate well-considered decisions.
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